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Seven
ZANGE AND SORGE: MODELS OF
“CONCERN” IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
OF RELIGION
James Mark Shields
Terms such as “concern” and “care” would appear, at first glance, far too
vague to be fit objects of serious philosophical treatment. And yet—whether
framed in terms of love, charity, or compassion—such concepts are central to
virtually all major religious worldviews and thus call for treatment by
philosophy of religion. Moreover, with the existentialist and
phenomenological movements, twentieth-century Western thought has
frequently turned its attention to matters that “bear our attention.” The
concept of Sorge, as developed in Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) classic
work, Being and Time (1927), is one prominent example of such. Variously
rendered into English as “care,” “concern,” or “solicitude,” Sorge has been
described as an existential-ontological state characterized by both “anxiety”
about the future and the desire to “attend to” or “care for” the world, based on
an awareness of temporality. In Heidegger’s terms, it is nothing less than the
existential meaning of the Being of Dasein—i.e., of human existence itself
(Heidegger, 1927, pp. 56–57; 1962, p. 83). And yet, for all its seeming
significance, the concept of Sorge remains relatively underdeveloped in Being
and Time and subsequent Western studies of Heidegger. At the same time, as
I intend to show, the concept would come to play a significant role in the
work of two important Japanese thinkers: Watusji Tetsurō (1889–1960) and
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), each of whom would, in his own unique way,
critically develop and nuance Heidegger’s concept (Heidegger, 1927, pp. 41,
57; 1962, pp. 65, 83–84).
In what follows, I will analyze the concept of Sorge as developed and
critiqued in the work of the above thinkers, with special attention given to the
notion of care as both an ontological and ethical category and as a potential
foundation for praxis. In addition to a theoretical analysis of these concepts, I
will also touch upon the inescapable fact that each of these thinkers—in their
own way—has been criticized for their role in supporting nationalist
ideologies in early twentieth century Germany and Japan. In this regard, the
materialist criticism of thinkers such as Tosaka Jun (1900–1945) will also be
briefly discussed.
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For Heidegger, Sorge is manifested in choices made by individuals in
response to the possibilities recognized in other human beings, based on the
uniqueness of these beings. There is or perhaps should be an element of
disruption in this recognition, since for Heidegger authentic existence can
only be found in a break with conventional beliefs and assumptions—a break
from what he called the They (das Man) or they-self. As is expressed
throughout Being and Time, ordinary humanity finds itself in a situation of
fallenness (Verfall) or alienation, though this should be interpreted in a
dialectical rather than strict lapsarian sense. That is to say, fallenness is in fact
a necessary condition for Dasein’s awakening to authenticity via Sorge—care
or solicitude (Heidegger, 1927, pp.126–130; 1962, pp. 163–68). It is thus, in
some sense, a form of existential felix culpa.
For those familiar with Buddhist thought, the non-temporal and
transformational dialectic of Sorge bears resemblance to Mahāyāna tropes
regarding the interplay or coalescence of ordinary, worldly-being (saṃsāra)
and the state of awakening (nirvāṇa). This is especially evident in the
following remark by Heidegger: “authentic existence is not something which
floats above falling everdayness. Existentially, it is only a modified way in
which such everydayness is seized upon” (see Steiner, 1989, pp. 97–98).
Whereas Buddhists might prescribe meditation as the primary instrument with
which to effect this “seizure,” for Heidegger it is Sorge that liberates us from
what the tranquilizing busyness of ordinary existence or what he calls, using a
familiar Buddhist terms in a non-Buddhist way: “the innocuous emptiness of
a worldless occuring” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 179; 1962, p. 224). In short, while
Sorge as solicitude might be conceived as a foundation for ethical activity in
the world of other beings, it is, first and foremost, a recognition of and
attunment towards Being itself. That is, it is a resolute openness to the
transfigurative capacity of Being upon oneself and others. In this sense, Sorge
seems reflective of the traditional Christian idea of radical conversion or
metanoia in the face of God or the Ultimate. Think Paul on the road to
Damascus.
In Japan, Heidegger’s concept of Sorge was first borrowed and critically
developed by Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), a philosopher who worked on the
margins of the Kyoto School, Japan’s most significant twentieth-century
philosophical movement.
In Ethics (Rinrigaku, 1937–1949), Watsuji argues that Heidegger’s
Sorge remains overly reliant on the philosophical structures of Western
individualism and subjectivism, and thus neglects the social dimension of
human being (or the Mitsein of Dasein). Although Heidegger aptly moves us
away from the Cartesian cogito ergo sum to an approach that might be
summarized as tutela ergo sum (“I care, therefore I am”) the larger premise of
subjectivity is not fundamentally challenged. In attempting to think Heidegger
further, Watsuji contrasts Heidegger’s being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein)

Zange and Sorge: Models of Concern

91

to the Japanese concepts yononaka and seken (“the public”) which signify not
merely a spatiality of human relationships but also the temporality of such.
According to Watsuji, Heidegger erred in two distinct but related ways:
(1) his ultimate commitment to the language and philosophical structures of
individualism and consequent neglect of the social dimension of human being
(or the Mitsein of Dasein) and (2) his privileging of time and the temporal
over place and spatiality. Let us begin with the first point of criticism. Here
Watsuji diverges from the standard poststructuralist criticism offered by
Derrida and a few others, namely, that Heidegger was never able to free
himself from the “logocentrism” of Western metaphysics, even as he
managed to escape some of its other pitfalls. For Watsuji, it is not primarily in
the pining for Being that Heidegger goes astray (this is a regrettable but
understandable consequence of his rootedness in Western ontology or ontotheology), but in the very framework of this thought, where, in
Cartesian/Kantian (or perhaps Nietzschean/Kierkegaardian) fashion, the
primary relationship is between the “individual’—Dasein—and the nonhuman world (whether such is conceived as Nature, Being, or God).
Heidegger understood being-in-the-world in terms of the practical (or
“ready-to-hand”) use of “tools,” and thus, for all his claims to have
overthrown traditional metaphysical subjectivism, grounded his analysis in
inescapably subjectivist language. “[T]he spatiality inherent in “a being there”
is, in the final analysis, attributed to the relationship of concern between I and
tools and has nothing to do with the relationship of communication among
human beings” (Watsuji, 1996, p. 174).
Though tropes of “being-with” (Mitsein) and “Care” or “Concern”
(Sorge) occur quite often in the Heideggerian corpus, these themes, according
to Watsuji, remain relatively underdeveloped, and do not easily connect with
Heidegger’s more general thesis about Being and Time. This point requires
some elaboration. Sorge—in which the whole structure of Dasein is
understood, in its threefold nature as thrownness, fallenness, and possibility,
to be “ahead of itself in already being in the world as being alongside what it
encounters in the world”—is interpreted by Heidegger primarily if not solely
in terms of temporality, by way of anxiety and being-towards-death (Watsuji,
1996, p. 215). Thus Sorge ultimately lacks the sense of (embodied)
compassion between human beings.
We should note that Watsuji neglects to mention that Heidegger does in
fact deal with “place,” and in a quite novel way: in practical concern or Sorge,
Heidegger argues, distance itself becomes degeometricized, and thus space
becomes trans-spatial (for example, when speaking on the telephone, one’s
interlocutor is “nearer” than the person in the next room, because she is part
of one’s immediate “world”). Yet Watsuji is correct (and not the first to note)
that this perspective, which would seem to open up the possibility of Care
being manifest in terms of the space of neighborliness, is a path that
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Heidegger deigns not to pursue. This may be because, in an obvious debt to
Nietzsche (but also to Jaspers and perhaps even, somewhat ironically, to the
Frankfurt School) Heidegger was intensely, almost obsessively wary of Mass
Society or the Public—das Man. Dasein, after all, cannot be entirely an “I
am” if it also has to be a “with-them.”
Thus a non-trivial tension arises between authentic being-with and
inauthentic being-with-Them. It became clear to Heidegger that one of the
lamentable symptoms of the modern age is precisely that “one’s own Dasein
dissolves completely into the kind of being of ‘the Others’ . . .”—thus das
Man emburdens authentic being-in-the-world. Though Care unifies Dasein,
even Care must recognize the fallenness of man-as-They. For the Frankfurt
thinkers and many existentialists, this situation of “alienation” requires
nothing less than a (Kierkegaardian) leap into subjectivity, even if it is a leap
without a sure foundation or goal.
But, again, Heidegger’s Care is not primarily an “ethical’ modality; his
use of this term, as with so many others, rids it of its conventional meaning.
For Heidegger, this divestiture or deconstruction is a necessary step towards
rediscovering the true meaning of terms; for others (such as Pierre Bourdieu)
it is an emptying out of meaning with deep and disastrous implications on the
philosophical and political level.
For Watsuji, however, the problem of subjectivity in Heidegger is made
worse by an over-emphasis on temporality, a temporality that “fails to
materialize in the form of historicality”—which is the concrete temporality of
persons-in-community (Watsuji, 1996, p. 221). One’s thrownness is a burden,
and the sense of repentance—of coming to terms with one’s past—is not at all
evident in the Heideggerian concept. In attempting to think Heidegger further,
Watsuji contrasts Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein to the Japanese concepts
yononaka and seken (“the public”) which signify not merely a spatiality of
human relationships but also their temporality and historicity. Moreover,
Watsuji raises the problem of the key philosophical term Sein or Being.
Within Western philosophy, Being plays the role of the ground of existence
and of logic: it is the “A is A” (Fichte) and the “direct, undetermined ‘to be’”
(Hegel) (Watsuji, 1996, p. 19). However, the grandeur, plenitude, and
objectivity of Being limit its applicability in terms of ethics. Western Being
must be re-evaluated in terms more familiar and applicable to the Japanese
situation, and to the condition of sociality more generally. Watsuji suggests
that the Japanese term sonzai (son = maintenance or subsistence against loss
[time] + zai = remaining within relationships [space]) is a more appropriate
term for describing “the subjective, practical, and dynamic structure of human
being” (ibid., p. 21).
Thus, though Heidegger goes beyond the “contemplative approach” to
human existence, which reached an apogee in the “transcendental
phenomenology” of his mentor Edmund Husserl, his remarks on “concernful
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dealings,” while opening up spatiality as the structure of subjective existence,
ultimately confines such to the relation of human beings and tools, and
effectively bypasses interpersonal relationships.
Watsuji’s contemporary, Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) of the Kyoto
School, developed an alternative theory of “concern” in his reflections on
zange, especially as found in his magnum opus, Philosophy as Metanoetics
(Zange toshite no tetsugaku, 1948). For Tanabe, zange, translated as
“metanoesis” or “metanoetics” involves the intense recollection of one’s past
sins, combined with the wish that these sins had not been committed. In short,
it is a radical transformation that is at one and the same time a form of
repentance—though this repentence takes place at the level of one’s entire
being. At first glance, Tanabe’s formulation seems both radically subjectivist
and distinctly Christian. However, like Watsuji, he attempts to situate
“concern” within the context of society via a process of what he calls
“absolute mediation,” the previously restricted self “surrenders” to its own
self-criticism, and is thereby liberated to the point where it can truly engage
with other beings. Also, like Watsuji, Tanabe self-consciously incorporates
models of thought borrowed from Asian intellectual traditions, including
Buddhism—especially the Pure Land traditions.
In addition, Tanabe’s focus on the self-as-agent/agency (shutai) over the
self-as-contemplative consciousness (shakun), reflects his Marxist
sympathies, as well as his general desire to bring ethics and history into the
heart of modern Japanese thought. A prominent conception in postwar
Japanese Marxism was the (Sartrean) notion that the “abyss” of nothingness
must underlie the freedom of the acting subject in the historical world (see
Katsumi, 1947). Likewise, Tanabe’s “subject” is first and foremost an agent, a
subject-in-action or in-relation-with-others. Thus Tanabe would concur with
Watsuji’s comment that “[t]he study of ethics is the study . . . of the subject
as a practical, active connection” (jissenteki kōiteki renkan)” (Koschmann,
1996, p. 103).
The key terms in Tanabe’s formulation that distinguish his own work
from that of the other major Japanese thinkers are the logic of species,
metanoesis, and absolute mediation. For the purposes of this paper, I shall
speak only of the last two, which are the most important tropes in Philosophy
as Metanoetics.
As previously noted, metanoesis or zange entails a radical tranformation
or movement (the literal meaning of metanoia) linked to repentance. Crucial
to Tanabe’s thesis is the fact that the meta of meta-noetics implies that such
ultimately “surpasses the position of mere contemplation (noesis)” (Takeuchi,
cited in Heisig, 1986, p. xlv). Yet what must also be noted is precisely the
“after” aspect of meta-noesis, which is not meant to be anti-rational or
irrational, that is, not an erasure or sublation of reason, logic, language, or
criticism, but a way of pushing the critique of reason to its limits, a task, in
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Tanabe’s eyes, begun but left incomplete by Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and
Heidegger. In fact, Tanabe goes so far as to call his logic of metanoetics
“absolute criticism.”
Absolute criticism is nothing less than the existential involvement of the
subject involved in the critical task, such that, faced with the “crisis of its own
dilemma,” the subject “surrenders” to its own self-criticism. This is not
expressed by Tanabe in terms of the self’s dissolution, but rather as the
“breaking-through (Durchbruch) of a self that hitherto had moved exclusively
within the realms of discursive thinking and reflection” (Tanabe, 1986, p. 4).
Moreover, this is the point at which “absolute mediation” becomes involved:
the “truth” of the absolute can only “function” in its relative mediation with
the world of forms and relative beings. “In this sense, the transformation
through vertical mediation between the absolute and the self (Thou and I)
must also be realized in horizontal social relationships between my self and
other selves (I and Thou)” (ibid., p. lviii). In other words, absolute mediation
takes the form of mediation through other beings; “the effect of the absolute
on the relative only becomes real as the effect of the relative on the relative.”
(ibid., p. 19, italics added).
Here we see an obvious parallel with Watsuji’s concept of aidagara or
“betweenness” as the ground for ethics and human being, and also with
Heidegger’s Sorge as a turn towards authenticity via an an openness or
answerability towards Being, which allows us to break through inauthenticity.
Yet Tanabe moves further than either Watsuji or Heidegger towards a
grounding in historical reality. For Tanabe, nothingness does not or cannot
appear in itself but only through the medium of historical being.
“What determines the individual is always species as an historical,
relative particular form of being. It is not some absolute negativity of
nothingness apart from the movement of this relative negativity”
(Koschmann, 1996, p. 118). Absolute mediation takes place only through the
irruption of absolute nothingness into relative being. Using more distinctly
Buddhist terms: [b]eing here is “being as upāya,” [hōbentiki-sonzai] that is,
being as a mediator of nothingness. Moreover, human existential selfawareness, which realizes the compassion and altruism of the bodhisattva
through the equality of mutual transformation, must be a mediation of
nothingness in the sense of just such a transformation of subjectivity (Tanabe,
1986, p. 109).
Thus, Tanabe concludes, zange—and only zange—is able to overcome,
on the one hand, the problems of individualism that beset Western
conceptions of freedom and, on the other, the lack of individual
agency/ethics/this-worldliness of which Buddhism, and Zen in particular, is
often (with some justification) accused.
In short, from the perspective of Japanese critics like Watsuji and
Tanabe, Heidegger’s rejection of the metaphysical “forgetting of Being,”
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necessitated a turn from “ontic” (ontisch) to “ontological’ (ontologische
thinking. This move, while effectively subverting the Cartesian and Kantian)
ego, also subverts the community of egos that make up the dominant Western
conception of sociality. While this is, in some ways, a positive
“deconstructive” move, Heidegger lacks the concepts or terms to allow for a
rebirth of sociality out of emptiness or betweenness. In short, “man,” in
becoming “the neighbor of Being,” loses touch with his neighbors who
happen to be mere “beings.” For Watsuji, the result is not an overcoming of
nihilism (which the Heideggerian project, in the wake of Nietzsche, claimed
to be), but rather a nihilism in extremis.
As with many thinkers living and writing during the tumultuous decade
leading up to the Second World War, the ideas of Heidegger, Watsuji and
Tanabe have to be contextualized in light of the ideological currents and
political realities of the 1930s and early 1940s. This critique extends to the
connection between their ideas and the dominant (i.e., fascist or imperialist)
ideologies of the day. The Case of Heidegger is well-known and need not be
rehearsed here. During the 1930s and early 1940s, Watsuji felt compelled to
concretize his philosophy in relation to the Imperial system of wartime Japan,
effectively collapsing the tension between self and other into a merging of self
with the “absolute totality” of the nation-family (see Odin,1992, p. 491; Dale,
1986; Piovesana, 1969). It is perhaps more surprising that Tanabe, too, was
drawn into this ideological web. Indeed, some of his statements during the
early 1940s are, at least on face, more extreme than anything coming from
Watsuji or Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), the leading figure of the Kyoto
School and Tanabe’s erstwhile mentor (see Ohnuki-Tierney, 2002, pp. 5,
253).
This is a complex issue that I cannot fully address here, yet I find myself
persuaded by critic Karatani Kōjin, who makes the case that Tanabe, Watsuji
and Nishida all fell prey to what Karatani calls the lure of “aesthetics.”
Karatani uses Marxist critic Tosaka Jun, a contemporary of Tanabe, Watsuji,
and Nishida, to argue that these thinkers were beholden to a romantic tradition
of thought that emerged out of a post-Kantian formulation of aesthetics as a
vehicle for the surmounting or unification of contradictions, such as “those
between the personal and the communal and between the individual and the
totalistic” (Karatani, 2005, p. 109). In this sense, aesthetics gives birth to
absolutism and, in effect, paves the way for fascism—in thought if not in
practice. To my mind, the tragedy here is that Watsuji and Tanabe recognize
in their respective formulations of aidagara and zange the necessity of an
oscillation between self and other, individual, and society. That is to say, the
tendency in much of their best philosophical work is towards moderation, not
extremism. Tanabe, in particular, was critical of the Nishidan tendency
towards abstraction and the neglect of historical realities, tendencies he
summed up with the blanket term “culturalism” (Tanabe, 1986, pp. 261–262).
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And yet, like many others, Tanabe was unwilling or unable to fully ground his
ideas in terms of what Harry Harootunian calls “the world of everyday space”
(Harootunian, 2009, pp. 84–85; also pp. 93–105).

